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Abstract
Official and four alternative regime classification schemes based on observed exchange rate
behaviour are used to examine the relationship with inflation and growth in 91 developing countries
over the period 1984-2001. Apart from one scheme that produces markedly unfavourable results
for floating (for reasons that are discussed in the paper), the consistent findings are that (a) floats
have similar growth rates to soft pegs and only slightly higher inflation; and (b) hard pegs have
lower inflation and slower growth than other regimes.
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∗The views and interpretations are those of the authors and do not represent those of the World
Bank and its Executive Directors, nor the countries that they represent.
   
1. INTRODUCTION 
For countries with weak monetary institutions, it is an important issue whether an 
external nominal anchor can provide the price stability that they cannot otherwise 
secure, and whether it can do so without sacrificing growth.  The Asian crisis 
focused observers’ attention on the fact that exchange rate regimes in developing 
countries are not always quite what they are claimed to be.  This realisation 
stimulated the development of classification schemes other than those reported by 
the IMF which, up until then, had been self-declarations by countries’ authorities.  
This proliferation of classification schemes has made it harder to reach a 
definitive answer to the question of the relationship between the exchange rate 
regime and macroeconomic outcomes, such as inflation and growth.  For example, 
published results for different schemes suggest that in developing countries 
floating is associated with either significantly higher growth (Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, 2003), significantly lower growth in some specifications (Husain et 
al., 2005), or no significant difference (Ghosh et al., 2002). 
Can these differences be resolved, or at least better understood? Potential 
sources of difference are the setting of the boundary between a peg and a float, the 
use of different samples, or the peculiarities of a particular classification 
algorithm.   We show here that, despite a surprising degree of disagreement across 
schemes in classifying particular observations, the broad picture is that the choice 
of exchange rate regime makes little difference to inflation and growth in 
developing countries.  There are two exceptions to this.  One is that hard pegs 
tend to be associated with significantly lower inflation than soft pegs or floats. 
The other is that one widely used classification scheme tends to produce outlying 
results.  Although this scheme identifies fewer floats than others, it seems more 
likely that it is essentially some unintended features of the classification algorithm 
that make it an outlier. 
Even using the officially declared regime, there are aggregation issues in 
reducing the ten or so categories to a smaller number.  Throughout this paper we 
distinguish three categories: floats, easily adjustable pegs (“soft pegs”) and those 
where adjustment is harder (“hard pegs”, defined by use of a shared currency or a 
currency board system).  It is important to separate out hard pegs because 
constraints on devaluation may be critical to the effectiveness of a peg as a 
nominal anchor. 
We investigate four alternative classification schemes that purport to 
measure what the exchange rate regime is rather than what is declared to be.  The 
four schemes are those of Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002), Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005), Shambaugh (2004) and Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).  Details 
of these schemes are discussed in the next section.  The correlation between these 
classification systems, beyond the obvious cases, is surprisingly low, and not just 
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because behaviour differs from official claims: alternative de facto classification 
systems produce disconcertingly different results (Bleaney and Francisco, 2007a).  
Here we focus on what difference this makes to the empirical relationship 
between exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic outcomes (inflation and 
growth) in developing countries, which are more likely than advanced countries to 
have weak monetary institutions and therefore to rely on an exchange rate peg for 
monetary credibility.  Such a policy is considerably less attractive if there is a 
growth penalty attached. 
We focus exclusively on the statistical association between 
macroeconomic outcomes and exchange rate regimes, and we do not attempt to 
identify causality.  This is partly because the persistence of regimes makes 
causality issues difficult to resolve, and partly because causality only becomes an 
issue once a statistical association has been established. 
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Table 1.   Details of Classification Schemes and Findings for Developing Countries 
 
Scheme IMF Bubula and 
Ötker-Robe 
Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff 
Shambaugh 
Methodology Country’s self-
declaration 
Self-declaration 
checked against 
other sources and 
exchange rate 
volatility  
Cluster analysis 
based on volatility 
of exchange rate and 
international 
reserves 
Uses parallel rate 
where available.  
Float requires 
>20% months in 5-
year span with >5% 
change in rate 
Peg defined as no 
change in parity in 
11 out of 12 months 
or exchange rate 
stays within 2% 
range 
Dating Monthly Monthly Calendar year Monthly Calendar year 
Findings with 
respect to inflation 
Hard peg < soft peg 
< other regimes 
Hard peg < other 
regimes 
Hard peg < other 
regimes 
Peg < float Not investigated 
Findings with 
respect to growth 
No significant 
differences 
No significant 
differences 
Peg < float No consistent 
differences 
Not investigated 
Source of findings Ghosh et al. (2002) Bleaney and 
Francisco (2005) 
Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2001, 
2003) 
Husain et al. 
(2005) 
 
Sample period 1970-99 1991-2001 1974-2000 1970-99  
Categories used Hard peg; soft peg; 
intermediate; float 
Hard peg; soft peg; 
floats 
Peg; crawling peg; 
managed float; free 
float 
Pre-announced or 
de facto peg; 
limited flexibility; 
managed float; free 
float 
Peg; float 
High-inflation 
observations 
separated out? 
No Yes No Yes No 
Stringency of 
definition of peg 
Medium Medium Medium Low High 
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2. CLASSIFICATION SCHEMES 
 
Table 1 summarises the main features of classification schemes and the empirical 
results obtained with them.  Schemes differ quite markedly in methodology.  In 
investigating the relationship between exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic 
outcomes, many authors use several specifications (e.g. with or without country 
fixed effects; with or without additional control variables) in order to test 
robustness, so Table 1 focuses on the main results. 
The IMF classification scheme has been extensively analysed by Ghosh et 
al. (2002).  Using a large data set of 147 countries over a thirty-year period (1970-
99), they find that, according to official IMF classifications, pegs are associated 
with significantly lower inflation than intermediate regimes (such as crawling 
pegs or tightly managed floats) or floats, except in the advanced countries.  With a 
finer classification of regimes (their Table 6.3), they find that hard pegs have the 
lowest inflation, but that other pegs still have lower inflation than more flexible 
regimes.  They find no robust difference in growth rates across regimes. 
Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002) [hereafter BOR] backdate the IMF practice 
begun in 1999 of checking the self-declared exchange rate regime against other 
statistical and documentary evidence about the official exchange rate.  A regime is 
only defined as a peg if there is documentary evidence of a policy of pegging, as 
well as exchange rate stability.1  Although their classification is not available 
before 1990, it is of interest because of its close affiliation to the IMF’s current 
methodology, which is essentially an informed observer’s judgement about the de 
facto regime.   With respect to inflation and growth, the BOR classification 
produces similar results to the IMF classification (Bleaney and Francisco, 2005).  
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) [LYS] use cluster analysis to 
generate one observation per calendar year, based on three variables: the volatility 
of the nominal exchange rate level against the identified anchor currency (average 
absolute monthly percentage change), the volatility of exchange rate changes 
(standard deviation of monthly percentage changes), and the volatility of foreign 
exchange reserves (average absolute monthly percentage change in net dollar 
international reserves relative to the dollar value of the monetary base in the 
previous month).  This last is intended as a measure of the commitment to 
managing the exchange rate, but since what is used is a measure of actual 
intervention, which may vary considerably even though the commitment remains 
unchanged, it is probably at least partly responsible for the large number of 
regime switches in this classification.  Using this classification, Levy-Yeyati and 
                                                          
1 They write (p. 11): “[w]hen available information indicated that the authorities targeted to keep 
the exchange rate stable and the exchange rate remained within a range less than 2 per cent for at 
least four months vis-à-vis a given currency, the regime was classified de facto as a conventional 
fixed peg.” 
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Sturzenegger (2001, 2003) claim that floats are associated with significantly 
higher growth in non-industrial countries, by about one percentage point per 
annum. 
Shambaugh (2004) [JS] aims only to differentiate pegs from other 
regimes.  For a peg classification, the nominal exchange rate must remain within a 
two per cent band within the year, or have zero movement for eleven out of 
twelve months, which is a relatively strict definition that, for example, excludes 
all crawling pegs.  If neither criterion is met, the regime is a non-peg.  Like LYS, 
his scheme generates annual classifications only.  Up to now macroeconomic 
outcomes have not been investigated using this classification. 
Finally, Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) [RR] use a classification methodology 
based on the parallel rather than the official exchange rate, where such a rate 
exists.   The use of the parallel rate is unique to this scheme, and may well be 
responsible for the rather different results that we obtain with it.   The authors 
justify it on the grounds that, where the parallel rate premium is high, the official 
rate ultimately moves towards the parallel rate rather than vice versa.  We discuss 
this issue further below.   Their statistical approach is based purely on exchange 
rate movements, on the grounds that reserve movements are an unreliable measure 
of exchange market intervention.  They allow regimes to be categorised as a peg 
or a band even if a significant minority of exchange rate movements is large, 
based on rolling five-year windows.2 Husain et al. (2005, Table 9), using the RR 
classification for 1970-99, conclude that in developing countries (other than 
emerging markets), exchange rate flexibility is associated with significantly 
higher inflation, but it is unclear whether this finding is robust to the separation of 
hard and soft pegs.  In some of their regressions intermediate regimes appear to 
have significantly higher growth rates. 
Various issues emerge from this body of work.  One is that distinguishing 
devaluations from genuine flexibility of the exchange rate is a problem for any 
statistical algorithm.  Under the LYS scheme one sizeable devaluation can be 
sufficient to cause a year to be classified as a float, because of its impact on the 
exchange rate volatility measures (e.g. the CFA franc in 1994).   The JS and RR 
schemes allow infrequent large changes in their definition of a peg in order to 
avoid this pitfall.  A judgemental approach has less of a problem in this respect. 
A second issue is the treatment of episodes of extreme inflation.  Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2004) show that these episodes are characterised by exceptionally 
low growth, so their inclusion can distort the results.  Like RR, we separate all 
observations with an inflation rate over 40% into a “freely falling” category, and 
mostly omit them from the analysis. 
                                                          
2 Any monthly observation falls in 60 such rolling windows.  For the observation to be classified 
as a float, none of these 60 rolling windows must meet the criteria for some form of peg or band.  
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that floats are relatively infrequent in this classification. 
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A third problem is the choice of regime categories.  Crawling pegs are 
often put into an intermediate category, but that tends to make the classification 
endogenous to the inflation rate.  For this reason we avoid an intermediate 
category, and classify crawling pegs as pegs.3  As already mentioned, we also 
separate hard from soft pegs.  We define hard pegs as currency board systems and 
the absence of a separate legal tender.  Currency boards incorporate rules 
preventing sterilisation of reserve losses, and the parity is frequently backed by 
legal commitments.  Lack of a separate legal tender means that devaluation cannot 
be a unilateral decision (as in the case of currency unions such as the CFA zone) 
or is effectively impossible (where the country has adopted the currency of a 
much bigger country, commonly referred to as dollarisation).4  Since not all 
schemes separate out hard pegs, we impose a common definition across all 
classification schemes; consequently the differences across schemes relate to the 
distinction between soft pegs and floats. 
For each classification scheme, we separate the observations that are not 
hard pegs and not “freely falling” into soft pegs and floats.  Floats are those that 
are described as free, managed or dirty floats.  Other regimes that are sometimes 
lumped into an intermediate category, such as crawling pegs or bands, we label as 
a form of soft peg.  The one exception to this is the JS classification, which uses a 
relatively narrow definition of a peg, and categorises everything else as a non-peg. 
 
 
3. THE DATA 
 
We use annual data for all developing countries other than transition countries 
from 1984 to 2001 from World Development Indicators.  We exclude transition 
countries because they were socialist economies in the 1980s and in a transitional 
state for much of the 1990s.  The classifications are as published by the 
originators of the schemes. 
There is an important timing issue.  For the classification schemes that 
generate monthly observations (IMF, BOR, RR), we compare macroeconomic 
outcomes for a calendar year with the exchange rate regime in place at 31 
December of the previous year, to minimise endogeneity problems.  For the LYS 
and JS schemes, that generate only calendar-year observations, we focus on the 
previous-year classifications, but we also check that the results are not markedly 
different using the current-year classifications. 
It is instructive to analyse the 617 observations that are common to each 
classification and which are not hard pegs or inflationary crises.  As Table 2 
                                                          
3 This does not apply to the JS classification, in which crawling pegs are classified as non-pegs 
along with floats. 
4 This definition of hard pegs is standard (e.g. Bubula and Ötker-Robe, 2002). 
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shows, the proportion of these observations classified as floats rather than soft 
pegs is 41.1 per cent for the IMF classification, 71.0 per cent for the JS 
classification, 45.7 per cent for the LYS classification, 28.2 per cent for the RR 
classification and 49.9 per cent for the BOR classification.  Thus alternative 
classifications vary considerably in the proportion of floats identified.  These 
differences primarily reflect the stringency of the definition of a peg.  For 
example, if the monthly exchange rate movement exceeds 5% in less than 12 
months of a 60-month rolling window, that would be sufficient for RR to classify 
the regime as a band rather than a float for all 60 months.5 
Perhaps more surprising are the rather low correlations between the 
classifications in relation to the identification of floating regimes as opposed to 
soft pegs, with the exception of the IMF/BOR pair (see Table 2).  The correlation 
between the IMF and BOR classifications is 0.64, but de facto schemes agree 
even less with each other than with the de jure classification.  The average 
correlation with other classifications is 0.36 for IMF, and varies from 0.40 (BOR) 
down to 0.16 (RR) for the alternative classifications.  What this indicates is that 
purely statistical methods of identifying exchange rate regimes produce markedly 
different results not only from other approaches, but also from each other.  
Perhaps most notable is the fact that the RR classification, based on parallel rates, 
is something of an outlier. 
 
Table 2.  Correlations between Classification Schemes 
 CLASSIFICATION SCHEME  
 IMF JS LYS RR BOR Proportion 
of floats 
IMF 1     0.411 
JS 0.37 1    0.710 
LYS 0.28 0.38 1   0.457 
RR 0.15 0.08 0.05 1  0.282 
BOR 0.64 0.38 0.24 0.35 1 0.494 
Mean 0.36 0.30 0.24 0.16 0.40  
Notes.  The correlations refer to a common sample of 617 observations excluding hard 
pegs and inflationary crises, except in the case of the BOR classification which is 
unavailable before 1990.  For the BOR classification the sample is 413 observations.  The 
final column gives the proportion of observations identified as floats in each classification 
scheme. 
 
 
                                                          
5 Floats with naturally low volatility, such as Canada and Switzerland, do not appear as floats in 
the RR classification for this reason. 
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4. EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND INFLATION 
 
We are now ready to examine the relationship between exchange rate regimes and 
macroeconomic performance.  In order that the results should not be unduly 
distorted by outliers, we exclude the cases of extremely rapid exchange rate 
depreciation (defined by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) as “freely falling”). We also 
transform the inflation rate as 
p
p
+100
100 , where p is the percentage change in the 
consumer price index since the previous year.  This is less than but very close to p 
for small positive p, but tends to 100 as p tends to infinity, thus compressing 
differences at the high end of the range. 
 Since inflation tends to be persistent, we estimate the following regression 
separately for each classification scheme: 
 
 πj,t = a + b0 πj,t-1 + b1DHPj,t-1 + b2 DFLOATc,j,t-1 + year dummies  (1) 
 
where πj,t represents inflation in country j in year t, DHPj,t-1 is a dummy for a hard 
peg, and DFLOATc,j,t-1 is a dummy for a float as identified by classification 
scheme c for that observation at the previous 31 December (or calendar year in the 
case of JS and YS).  Year dummies are included to control for global inflation 
fluctuations that affect all the countries in the sample, but no country fixed effects 
are included.6 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating equation (1) for the various 
classification schemes.  The hard-peg dummy compares average inflation rates for 
hard pegs (which are similarly defined across all classifications) with the omitted 
category of soft pegs (whose definition varies with the classification).  The float 
dummy compares average inflation rates for floats with those for soft pegs. 
The hard peg dummy is consistently highly significant and negative.  Its 
coefficient indicates a short-run effect on inflation of about –2.5 percentage 
points, and a long-run effect (allowing for the coefficient of 0.5 on the lagged 
dependent variable) of about twice that, relative to a soft peg.  Subject to the 
caveats mentioned above regarding causality, this suggests that putting obstacles 
in the way of devaluation helps to promote price stability.   The float dummy is 
                                                          
6 The lagged dependent variable is highly significant for both inflation and per capita growth, 
although it is omitted by many authors (e.g. Husain et al., 2005; Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 
2003), who also estimate regressions with country dummies and/or or a series of control variables 
that in practice operate rather like country dummies because their cross-country ordering changes 
little over time (e.g. GDP per capita).  Country dummies reduce the effective sample to those 
countries that have switched regime, which is untrue of most hard-peg countries, and consequently 
makes the hard-peg effect much less precisely identified, as we show in an earlier version of this 
paper (Bleaney and Francisco, 2007b). 
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statistically significant in only two out of five cases.  Its coefficient, which is 
always positive, suggests a relatively mild effect: a short-run impact of about one 
percentage point, and therefore a long-run effect of about two percentage points.  
An exception is the RR classification, for which the float dummy has a much 
larger coefficient (+3.7).  Why the RR classification might produce different 
results will be discussed later. 7 
 
Table 3.  Inflation and Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 CLASSIFICATION SCHEME 
 IMF JS LYS RR 
 
BOR 
Constant 2.78∗∗ 
(0.61) 
2.50∗∗ 
(0.64) 
3.47∗∗ 
(0.73) 
3.25∗∗ 
(0.58) 
2.84∗∗ 
(0.60) 
Hard peg 
dummy 
−2.44∗∗ 
(0.45) 
−2.04∗∗ 
(0.49) 
−2.64∗∗ 
(0.53) 
−2.85∗∗ 
(0.46) 
−1.90∗∗ 
(0.48) 
Floating 
dummy 
0.73 
(0.40) 
1.12∗ 
(0.51) 
0.77 
(0.45) 
3.73∗∗ 
(0.63) 
0.65 
(0.53) 
Lagged 
inflation 
0.522∗∗ 
(0.04) 
0.519∗∗ 
(0.04) 
0.506∗∗ 
(0.05) 
0.443∗∗ 
(0.05) 
0.505∗∗ 
(0.05) 
Year 
dummies? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard 
error 
5.00 4.98 5.23 4.84 4.96 
Sample 
size 
1323 1323 1042 1061 885 
No. of 
countries 
92 92 85 74 91 
Time 
period 
1984−2001 1984−2001 1984−2001 1984−2001 1990−2001 
Notes.  The dependent variable is the transformed percentage change in the CPI since the 
previous year [100p/(100+p), where p is the raw percentage change].  Observations with 
p > 40 per cent p.a. are excluded.  The hard peg dummy is identical across classification 
schemes.  Excluded category is soft peg.  Figures in parentheses are standard errors 
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  ** - significant at 0.01; * - 
significant at 0.05. 
 
 
                                                          
7 Both the RR and YS classifications have a narrower country coverage than the others, but this is 
not important here.  Using a sample of observations that is common to all classifications other than 
BR produces similar results (Bleaney and Francisco, 2007b). 
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5. EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND GROWTH 
In this section we look at how per capita growth varies across exchange rate 
regimes at the end of the previous calendar year, using a similar specification to 
that used for inflation.  We exclude all observations where per capita growth is 
outside the range -10 per cent to +15 per cent, as these outliers are likely to be 
associated with civil wars and other disturbances, or the immediate recovery from 
them, and could seriously distort the results.  Panel A of Table 4 shows the results 
excluding the inflationary crisis observations with freely falling exchange rates, 
which are known to be associated with slow growth (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2004).  
Panel B includes these observations as a separate regime category, and also shows 
the effects of not separating hard from soft pegs. 
In Panel A, the main finding is that hard pegs are associated with 
significantly slower growth than soft pegs for every classification scheme.  The 
difference is economically significant – at least 0.7 percentage points p.a. in the 
short run and about one percentage point (= 0.7/(1 – 0.3)) in the long run.  Since 
there have been so few regime switches to and from hard pegs, this could just be 
the effect of hard pegs happening to be in countries that are slow-growing for 
other reasons (we discuss this further below).8  The floating dummy is significant 
only in the case of the RR classification, and very markedly so, with an estimated 
short run coefficient of –1.1 percentage points. 
In Panel B, the coefficient of the floating dummy is slightly more positive 
(or less negative) than in Panel A, because the omitted category is now all pegs 
and not just soft pegs.  In fact this makes the floating dummy significantly 
positive for the LYS classification, consistent with the results of Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2001, 2003).  Observations with inflation over 40% p.a. are 
characterised by slower growth in most classifications. 
 
                                                          
8 We show in Bleaney and Francisco (2007b) that, in a regression with fixed country effects, the 
hard-peg effect loses statistical significance. 
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Table 4. Per Capita Growth and Exchange Rate Regimes 
 
 CLASSIFICATION SCHEME 
 IMF JS LYS RR BOR 
 Panel A.  Omitting high-inflation observations 
Constant 0.96∗ 
(0.41) 
1.10∗∗ 
(0.41) 
0.82 
(0.46) 
0.97∗ 
(0.42) 
1.12∗∗ 
(0.41) 
Hard peg 
dummy 
−0.73∗ 
(0.35) 
−0.87∗∗ 
(0.34) 
−0.68∗ 
(0.32) 
−1.02∗∗ 
(0.33) 
−0.89∗∗ 
(0.27) 
Floating 
dummy 
0.06 
(0.26) 
−0.17 
(0.26) 
0.31 
(0.26) 
−1.07∗∗ 
(0.28) 
−0.22 
(0.29) 
Lagged per 
capita growth 
0.293∗∗ 
(0.05) 
0.293∗∗ 
(0.05) 
0.318∗∗ 
(0.05) 
0.288∗∗ 
(0.05) 
0.288∗∗ 
(0.06) 
Standard error 3.57 3.57 3.51 3.38 3.34 
Sample size 1260 1260 994 1023 864 
No. of 
countries 
93 93 86 74 92 
 Panel B.  Including high-inflation observations and combining 
hard and soft pegs 
Constant 0.54 
(0.38) 
0.58 
(0.38) 
0.44 
(0.44) 
0.44 
(0.40) 
0.62 
(0.37) 
Floating 
dummy 
0.35 
(0.24) 
0.24 
(0.24) 
0.52∗ 
(0.25) 
−0.78∗∗ 
(0.30) 
0.18 
(0.26) 
High-
inflation 
dummy 
−1.11∗∗ 
(0.42) 
−1.07∗ 
(0.42) 
−1.20∗∗ 
(0.42) 
−0.68 
(0.48) 
−0.90 
(0.50) 
Lagged per 
capita growth 
0.275∗∗ 
(0.05) 
0.276∗∗ 
(0.05) 
0.299∗∗ 
(0.05) 
0.287∗∗ 
(0.05) 
0.283∗∗ 
(0.05) 
Standard error 3.67 3.67 3.63 3.53 3.43 
Sample size 1387 1387 1102 1131 928 
No. of 
countries 
93 93 86 74 93 
Time period 1984−2001 1984−2001 1984−2001 1984−2001 1990−2001 
Notes.  The dependent variable is per capita GDP growth, with observations outside the 
range –10 to +15 per cent excluded.  High-inflation observations are those with inflation 
> 40 per cent p.a.  The hard peg dummy is identical across classification schemes. 
Excluded category is soft peg (panel A) or all pegs (Panel B).  Year dummies are also 
included in the regression.  Figures in parentheses are standard errors adjusted for 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.  ** - significant at 0.01; * - significant at 0.05. 
 
11
Bleaney and Francisco: Exchange Rate Regimes, Inflation and Growth
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
   
 6. FURTHER DISCUSSION 
 
The most striking feature of these results is the outlying nature of the RR 
classification, which suggests much worse outcomes for floating (higher inflation, 
lower growth) than any other classification.  Alesina and Wagner (2006) find that 
countries which claim to peg (according to the IMF) and actually float (according 
to RR) have poor institutional quality relative to those that claim to float and are 
classified by RR as a peg.  That suggests some unanticipated biases in RR’s float 
classification, which might be exacerbated by its relative rarity.    In this section 
we investigate this a bit further. 
Table 5 shows that, in the sample of observations with inflation under 40% 
that are not hard pegs, the RR classification is much more likely to identify a float 
if the inflation rate is over 25% than if it is under 25%, or in a country which has 
had inflation over 40% in at least one year in the sample.  Other classification 
schemes do not display the same bias.  
 
Table 5.  Classification of high-inflation observations 
 
 Inflation rate Countries with: 
 > 25 % < 25 % At least one 
year of 
inflation >  
40 % 
No years of 
inflation > 40 
% 
Number of 
observations 
71 546 237 381 
Classification 
scheme 
Proportion of observations classified as floats 
IMF 0.69 0.59 0.67 0.56 
JS 0.76 0.71 0.71 0.71 
YS 0.45 0.46 0.33 0.53 
RR 0.68 0.23 0.42 0.19 
Notes.  Observations with inflation > 40 per cent p.a. are excluded.  The sample is the 
898 observations common to all four schemes, with the 279 hard peg observations 
excluded. 
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A distinctive feature of the RR classification is its use of parallel exchange 
rates.   For many countries parallel rates stay close to official rates, and for those 
countries the use of parallel rates probably makes little difference (in other words 
the RR classification would identify fewer floats even if it used official rates).  
For some observations, however, the parallel-market premium on foreign 
currency is large.  We have constructed a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if this premium exceeds 50%, and zero otherwise.  Table 6 reports a probit 
regression of the probability of a float classification (the alternative being a soft 
peg) as a function of this parallel-market premium dummy and a dummy for 
inflation over 25%.   The RR classification is distinctive both in the strength of the 
inflation effect and in the positive coefficient on the parallel-market premium 
(according to most other classifications, a high premium indicates a higher 
probability of a peg).  According to Table 6, in the RR classification inflation over 
25% makes a float 39% more likely, and a large parallel-rate premium makes a 
float 31% more likely. 
 
Table 6.  Analysis of the probability of a float classification 
 Classification scheme 
Independent 
variables 
IMF JS YS RR BOR 
Dummy for 
inflation > 25% 
0.256∗∗ 
(0.048) 
0.139∗∗ 
(0.042) 
0.215∗∗ 
(0.057) 
0.390∗∗ 
(0.056) 
0.134∗ 
(0.064) 
Dummy for 
parallel rate 
premium  > 50% 
−0.271∗∗ 
(0.037) 
−0.238∗∗ 
(0.042) 
−0.202∗∗ 
(0.043) 
0.307∗∗ 
(0.047) 
0.016 
(0.058) 
Sample size 1051 1051 771 783 703 
Period 1984-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 1990-2001 
Notes.  The table shows estimated marginal effects of a switch of each dummy from 0 to 1 in a 
probit regression. Figures in parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation.  Sample excludes hard pegs and observations with inflation > 40%. ** denotes 
significant at 0.01; * denotes significant at 0.05. 
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The regional distribution of floats is also unusual in the RR classification, 
as Table 7 shows.  This classification identifies a particularly low proportion of 
floats in East and South Asia (the fastest-growing region) and a particularly high 
proportion in the slowest-growing one (sub-Saharan Africa). 
 
Table 7.  Regional distribution of float classifications 
 
 Regional distribution of floats identified by the classification 
Classification Sub-
Saharan 
Africa 
Western 
Hemisphere 
East and 
South Asia 
Middle East 
& North 
Africa 
All 
IMF 0.319 0.325 0.254 0.102 1 
JS 0.372 0.244 0.286 0.099 1 
YS 0.272 0.401 0.218 0.109 1 
RR 0.541 0.279 0.064 0.116 1 
BR 0.425 0.327 0.215 0.033 1 
Notes.  Observations with inflation > 40% excluded.  The table shows the proportion of 
all floats that are identified by the classification that fall in the region shown (N.B. not the 
proportion of all observations in that region that are floats). 
 
 
Are these factors sufficient to account for the outlying results obtained 
with the RR classification?  Table 8 shows that the answer is no.  The RR float 
dummy has a less negative coefficient when we allow for these factors, but it is 
still statistically significant.  Note also that the hard peg effect is less significant 
than before.9  That is because hard pegs also have an unfavourable regional 
distribution (strongly represented in sub-Saharan Africa, and not at all in this 
sample in East and South Asia). 
The fact that in these exercises the RR classification produces such 
different results from other classifications, even de facto ones, does not 
necessarily mean that its statistical algorithm is without merit, but it does raise 
some questions about its reliability.  
                                                          
9 The loss of significance is mainly because of a reduction in the estimated coefficient, rather than 
an increase in the standard error. 
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Table 8.  Per Capita Growth and Exchange Rate Regimes with Additional 
Controls 
 
 CLASSIFICATION SCHEME 
 IMF JS LYS RR 
 
BOR 
Constant 0.88 
(0.50) 
0.98∗ 
(0.49) 
0.83 
(0.53) 
0.66 
(0.53) 
1.12∗∗ 
(0.38) 
Hard peg 
dummy 
−0.57 
(0.32 
−0.71∗ 
(0.34) 
−0.28 
(0.33) 
−0.68∗ 
(0.30) 
−0.59 
(0.35) 
Floating 
dummy 
0.07 
(0.22) 
−0.14 
(0.24) 
0.30 
(0.24) 
−0.64∗ 
(0.32) 
−0.09 
(0.27) 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
dummy 
−0.24 
(0.40) 
−0.19 
(0.40) 
−0.65 
(0.45) 
−0.23 
(0.50) 
−0.21 
(0.48) 
Western 
Hemisphere 
dummy 
0.30 
(0.38) 
0.35 
(0.38) 
0.07 
(0.43) 
0.35 
(0.43) 
0.17 
(0.46) 
East and 
South Asia 
dummy 
0.69 
(0.40) 
0.74 
(0.40) 
1.03∗ 
(0.45) 
1.18∗ 
(0.46) 
0.78 
(0.45) 
Dummy for 
inflation > 
25% 
−0.89∗ 
(0.39) 
−0.85∗ 
(0.39) 
−0.62 
(−0.19) 
−0.39 
(0.41) 
−0.83 
(0.43) 
Dummy for 
parallel-rate 
premium > 
50% 
−0.21 
(0.35) 
−0.25 
(0.35) 
−0.08 
(0.43) 
−0.32 
(0.39) 
0.49 
(0.46) 
Lagged per 
capita 
growth 
0.270∗∗ 
(0.03) 
0.276∗∗ 
(0.03) 
0.283∗∗ 
(0.04) 
0.260∗∗ 
(0.04) 
0.283∗∗ 
(0.04) 
Standard 
error 
3.55 3.55 3.47 3.46 3.32 
Sample size 1260 1260 994 1023 864 
No. of 
countries 
91 91 85 74 91 
Time period 1984−2001 1984−2001 1984−2001 1984−2001 1990−2001 
Notes.  The dependent variable is per capita GDP growth, with observations outside the 
range –10 to +15 per cent excluded.  Observations with inflation > 40% p.a. are excluded.  
The hard peg dummy is identical across classification schemes. Excluded category is soft 
peg.  Excluded region is Middle East and North Africa.   Year dummies are also included 
in the regression.  Figures in parentheses are heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. ** 
- significant at 0.01; * - significant at 0.05. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
 
If the declared exchange rate regime is an obvious fiction, there is a strong case 
for using some form of de facto classification scheme.   There are, however, many 
issues in constructing such schemes, such as: the precise nature of the statistical 
algorithm; how to allow for periodic devaluations; whether to take account of 
policy interventions, such as movements in foreign exchange reserves; setting 
maximum band widths; the time span over which the regime is evaluated; and 
whether to take account of parallel rather than official exchange rates.  In practice, 
because the authors of alternative schemes for classifying exchange rate regimes 
have approached these issues markedly differently, alternative schemes disagree 
with each other as much as with the official classification. 
We have shown that, when it comes to the correlation between the 
exchange rate regime and inflation and growth in developing countries, these 
differences are not always important.  Three out of four alternative schemes agree 
with the official classification in suggesting that growth rates in developing 
countries are similar under soft pegs and floats, and that inflation rates are not 
very different either.  Hard pegs, in which adjustment of the parity is inhibited 
either by legal barriers (currency boards) or the need for the agreement of other 
countries (a common currency), are associated with lower inflation and slower 
growth than other regimes, but there have been so few switches to and from hard 
pegs that it is impossible to distinguish clearly between a regime effect and fixed 
country effects. 
The result of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001, 2003) that floating is 
associated with significantly higher growth than pegs seems to lack robustness.  
We can reproduce this finding only by not separating out hard pegs, and even then 
only with their classification scheme. 
The Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) classification produces outlying results that 
are very unfavourable to floating.  This is partly explained by a bias of their floats 
towards countries with inflationary problems, and in slow-growing regions (sub-
Saharan Africa) and away from fast-growing ones (East and South Asia), but the 
difference is still significant after allowing for these effects.  There must therefore 
be a concern that the statistical algorithm used to identify floats in this 
classification has the unfortunate side-effect of picking out episodes of poor 
macroeconomic performance.  The use of parallel rates is probably of significance 
here.  Parallel rates tend to be most volatile when there is a large parallel-market 
premium, which is often an indicator of inconsistent monetary and exchange rate 
policies. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Countries in the sample (in alphabetical order of World Bank country code): 
 
Argentina Burundi Benin Burkina Faso  
BGD Bahrain Belize Brazil 
Bhutan Botswana Central Afr. Rep. Chile 
Côte d’Ivoire Cameroon Rep. of Congo Colombia 
Cape Verde Costa Rica Dominica Dominican Rep. 
Algeria Ecuador Egypt Ethiopia 
Fiji Gabon Ghana Gambia 
Guinea Bissau Grenada Guatemala Guyana 
Honduras Haiti Indonesia India 
Iran Jamaica Jordan Kenya 
Laos St Lucia Sri Lanka Morocco 
Madagascar Maldives Mexico Mali 
Myanmar Mauritania Mauritius Malawi 
Malaysia Niger Nigeria Nicaragua 
Nepal Oman Pakistan  Panama 
Peru Philippines Papua New Guinea Paraguay 
Rwanda Saudi Arabia Sudan Senegal 
Solomon Islands Sierra Leone El Salvador Suriname 
Swaziland Seychelles Syria Chad 
Togo Thailand Trinidad & Tobago Tunisia 
Turkey Tanzania Uganda Uruguay 
St Vincent & Gr. Venezuela Vanuatu South Africa 
Dem. Rep. Congo Zambia Zimbabwe 
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